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361 
New York’s Property Clerk Forfeiture Act—Can They 
Do That? 
Shirley W. Whittle* 
Drivers arrested in New York City for driving while intoxicated 
(DWI) can be forced to forfeit their automobiles.1 Commonly, these 
drivers respond in disbelief: “Can they do that? Isn’t that 
unconstitutional?”  
New York City’s Property Clerk Forfeiture Act (Forfeiture Act) 
allows the City of New York (the City) to seize the vehicle of anyone 
arrested for DWI.2 After a hearing, the City can auction the vehicle 
and even retain the proceeds from the sale.3 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has long upheld the constitutionality of forfeiture laws such as the 
City’s, based on the concept of guilty property.4 The Court reasons 
that seizing property prevents further illicit use of the property.5 In 
addition, the Court notes that forfeiture laws deter the illegal use of 
property and impose economic penalties that render illegal use 
unprofitable.6 
Part I of this Recent Development describes Supreme Court 
decisions upholding the constitutionality of similar forfeiture laws. 
Part I also examines the use of forfeiture laws by government entities 
other than New York City. Finally, Part I focuses on the New York 
City Forfeiture Act and explores the following issues: how the City 
 
 *  J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2000. 
 1. See N.Y. CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 14-140(b) (1999). 
 2. Id. The Forfeiture Act states that “all property . . . suspected of having been used as a 
means of committing crime or employed in aid or furtherance of crime . . . [and]  all property 
. . . taken from . . . a person appearing to be . . . intoxicated . . . shall be given, as soon as 
practicable, into the custody of and kept by the property clerk.” Id. See also Grinberg v. Safir, 
698 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that it is the City’s prerogative to seize 
vehicles of intoxicated drivers because such seizures are authorized by statute).  
 3. Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999), aff’d, 698 N.Y.S.2d 
218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
 4. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 275 (1996). 
 5.  Id. at 290 (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996)). 
 6. Id. (citing Bennis,  516 U.S. at 452). 
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established the Forfeiture Act, what the Mayor of the City hopes to 
accomplish with the Forfeiture Act, and whether the Forfeiture Act 
has been successful. 
Part II examines Grinberg v. Safir,7 the first case to scrutinize the 
constitutionality of New York’s Forfeiture Act. Part III analyzes the 
likelihood of the U.S. Supreme Court holding that the Forfeiture Act 
violates the Due Process Clause, Takings Clause, or Excessive Fines 
Clause. Finally, this Recent Development concludes that the 
Forfeiture Act should survive judicial scrutiny because it does not 
violate the U.S. Constitution and is consistent with the public policy 
behind forfeiture. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Supreme Court Traditionally Upholds the Constitutionality of 
Forfeiture Laws  
In Bennis v. Michigan8 the Supreme Court considered whether 
Michigan could constitutionally seize an automobile that had been 
used to solicit prostitution. The defendants were the married co-
owners of the automobile, which the husband used to solicit a 
prostitute.9 Michigan has a statutory abatement scheme that allows 
the state to seize an automobile by declaring it a public nuisance.10 
The statutory scheme does not provide compensation to co-owners, 
even if the co-owner had no knowledge of the illegal activity.11 After 
the husband was convicted of gross indecency, Michigan sued both 
the husband and the wife to have the vehicle declared a public 
nuisance and abated under Michigan’s forfeiture law.12 The wife 
contended that the forfeiture of the vehicle violated her due process 
 
 7. Grinberg , 698 N.Y.S.2d 218. 
 8. Bennis, 516 U.S. 442. 
 9. Id. at 443. 
 10. Id. at 445. 
 11. Id. at 443-44. See MICH . COMP . LAWS ANN. § 750.3386 (West 1995); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 600.3825 (1979). These statutes provide that if an individual uses his automobile for 
illegal purposes, such as prostitution, these activities will be declared a nuisance and, as such, 
an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the judgment in the case. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 
443 nn.1 & 2. 
 12. Bennis,  516 U.S. at 443-44. 
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rights because she did not know that her husband would use the 
vehicle to violate Michigan’s indecency law.13 The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, stating that there is a “long and unbroken line 
of cases” holding that a co-owner’s interest in property may be 
forfeited based on illegal use of the property, even if the co-owner 
did not know the property would be put to such use.14 The Court 
further noted that the state is not required to establish that the 
automobile’s principal use was illegal.15  
The wife also argued that the vehicle ’s forfeiture constituted a 
violation of the Takings Clause.16 The Court rejected this argument. 
The Court explained that the government is not required to 
compensate a property owner for property the government lawfully 
acquires under the exercise of governmental authority, unless the 
government acquires the property through eminent domain.17 
Therefore, the Court held that Michigan was free to seize the 
defendants’ vehicle and that the wife was not entitled to 
compensation for her property interest in the vehicle. The Court 
 
 13. Id. at 446. 
 14. Id. The long line of unbroken cases begins with The Palmyra , 25 U.S. 1 (1827). 
Palmyra, a vessel commissioned by the King of Spain, attacked a U.S. vessel. A U.S. warship 
captured the vessel and brought it to South Carolina for trial. Id. at 2. Spain argued that the 
vessel could not be forfeited until the owner was convicted for privateering. Id. at 9. Justice 
Story rejected this argument and held that “the offen[s]e is attached primarily to the thing . . . .” 
Id. at 24. The line of cases continues seventeen years later, when Justice Story concluded that 
the acts of the master and crew bind the interest of the owner of the ship, regardless of whether 
the owner is guilty or innocent. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210 (1844). Justice Story 
held that the owner impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture and 
attaches to the ship because of the crew’s unlawful acts. Id. The line of cases continues with 
Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1878), in which the Court upheld the 
forfeiture of property used by a lessee to fraudulently avoid federal alcohol taxes.  
 The Bennis Court, quoting Dobbins’s Distillery, reasoned that “it has always been held . . . 
that the acts of [the possessors] bind the interest of the owner . . . whether he be innocent or 
guilty.” 516 U.S. at 447. Next, the Court cited Van Oster v. Kan., 272 U.S. 465 (1926), which 
allowed the forfeiture of a purchaser’s interest in a vehicle because the seller had previously 
misused it. The Bennis Court stated that “[i]t is not unknown or indeed uncommon for the law 
to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of 
one to whom he has entrusted it.” 516 U.S. at 448. The Bennis Court also cited J.W. Goldsmith, 
Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921), and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), as additional support. 516 U.S. at 448-49. 
 15. Bennis,  516 U.S. at 450. 
 16. Id. at 452. The Fourteenth Amendment made the Fifth Amendment applicable to the 
states. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976). 
 17. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452. 
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reasoned that Michigan’s forfeiture law deters illegal activities that 
contribute to neighborhood deterioration and unsafe streets.18 The 
Court also noted that the long-standing precedent authorizing such 
forfeiture actions is “too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial 
jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.”19 
Just three months later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of 
forfeiture in United States v. Ursery.20 In Ursery, the United States 
instituted civil forfeiture proceedings to seize the defendant’s house, 
alleging that the defendant used the property to facilitate the unlawful 
production and distribution of a controlled substance.21 The defendant 
argued that the forfeiture violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.22 The 
Court rejected this argument citing Various Items of Personal 
Property v. United States, where the Court previously held that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to civil forfeiture actions.23 In 
Various Items, the Court stated that because forfeiture proceedings 
are against the property and not the owner, the Fifth Amendment 
does not apply.24 
In Ursery, the Court adopted a two-part test established in an 
earlier case to determine whether the forfeiture sanction was intended 
as punishment, and thereby characterized as essentially criminal 
rather than civil.25 The Court explained that the Double Jeopardy 
 
 18. Id. at 453. 
 19. Id. (quoting Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511). 
 20. 518 U.S. 267 (1996). 
 21. Id. at 271. Michigan police found marijuana growing adjacent to Ursery’s house and 
found marijuana seeds, stems, stalks, and a grow light within the house. Id. Ursery was indicted 
for manufacturing marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Id. at 271. A jury found him 
guilty of violating the statute and he was sentenced to sixty-three months in prison. Id. 
 22. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 271. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: “Nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents “both successive punishments and . . . 
successive prosecutions.” Ursery, 518 U.S. at 273 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 
688, 696 (1993)). “The protection against multiple punishments prohibits the Government from 
‘punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same offense.’” Id. at 
271 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 396 (1995), and quoting Helvering v. 
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)). 
 23. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 274 (citing Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 
282 U.S. 577 (1931)). 
 24. Id. at 275 (citing Various Items, 282 U.S. at 581). 
 25. Id. at 276-78 (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 
(1984)).  
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Clause applies only if the sanction is deemed criminal in character.26 
The first prong of the test requires the Court to determine whether 
Congress intended the statutory forfeiture as a remedial civil 
sanction.27 Under the second prong, the Court must consider whether 
the statutory scheme is so punitive, either in purpose or effect, that it 
negates Congress’s intent to establish a civil remedial mechanism.28 
In Ursery, the Court determined that the forfeiture of the house was 
civil in nature because, under the first prong of the test, the statutory 
mechanisms established to enforce such forfeitures demonstrated 
Congress’s intent that the forfeitures be a civil sanction.29 The Court 
concluded that “Congress specifically structured these forfeitures to 
be impersonal by targeting the property itself.”30 The Court also 
observed that the statute created distinctly civil procedures, further 
indicating Congress’s intent.31 The Court then turned to the second 
prong and stated that it found little evidence to suggest, regardless of 
Congress’s intent, that the forfeiture statutes were “so punitive in 
form and effect” that they were essentially criminal sanctions.32 The 
Court further noted that while the statutes may have certain punitive 
aspects, they also serve important nonpunitive goals.33 For example, 
the state’s ability to seize property that is used in drug-related 
offenses “encourages property owners to take care in managing their 
property and ensures that they will not permit their property to be 
used for illegal purposes.”34 The Court also noted that forfeiture may 
abate a nuisance and serve “the additional nonpunitive goal of 
ensuring that [property owners] do not profit from their illegal 
acts.”35 As such, the Court held that “in rem civil forfeitures” are 
neither punitive nor criminal sanctions, and therefore, do not violate 
 
 26. Id. at 277. 
 27. Id. at 277-78.  
 28. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 277-78. 
 29. Id. at 288-89.  
 30. Id. at 289. 
 31. Id. at 289. “In sum,‘by creating such distinctly civil procedures for forfeiture under 
[§§ 881 and 981], Congress has indicated clearly that it intended a civil, not criminal sanction.’” 
Id. (quoting 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 363) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted). 
 32. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 290. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. (citing Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452).  
 35. Id. at 290-91. See also Bennis,  516 U.S. at 452 (condoning abatement of a car as a 
nuisance and claiming forfeiture helps prevent further illegal use of property). 
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the Double Jeopardy Clause.36 Thus, the forfeiture of the defendant’s 
house was constitutional.37 
B. Other Government Entities Have Implemented Forfeiture Laws 
Like New York City, government entities increasingly adopt 
forfeiture laws to deter criminal activity. Federal and state laws, as 
well as municipal codes, frequently provide for seizure of private 
property by the government to deter violations of certain statutes.38 In 
particular, forfeiture laws target offenses which involve narcotics, 
gambling devices, or untaxed liquor.39 These statutes provide for the 
forfeiture of unlawful property and property used in association with 
the unlawful property or transaction, such as vehicles used to move 
contraband or money that is closely connected to contraband.40 In 
general, whether a court allows or denies the forfeiture depends on 
the facts of the case and the soundness of the evidence connecting the 
money to the contraband.41 Many opponents of forfeiture laws argue 
that the laws violate due process; however, the Supreme Court held 
otherwise and government entities are eager to put these laws to 
work.  
In Florida, state legislators are studying a proposal that would 
make Florida the next state to grant local municipalities the power to 
seize the vehicles of habitual drunk drivers.42 Under the proposal, if 
police officers stop a driver with a suspended or revoked license due 
to a prior conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), the 
officers can seize the vehicle if they suspect the driver is currently 
driving under the influence.43 The local government then can sell the 
 
 36. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 292. 
 37. Id.  
 38. John E. Theuman, Annotation, Forfeiture of Money to State or Local Authorities 
Based on its Association With or Proximity to Other Contraband, 38 A.L.R. 4th 496 (1985).  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Greg Retsinas, DUI Vehicles Could be Taken if Law OK’d Under the Proposed 
Legislation, Cars Seized From Repeat Offenders Could be Sold at Auction, SARASOTA 
HERALD-T RIB., Mar. 4, 1999, at 1A. There are currently twenty-three states that allow this 
practice. See id. 
 43. Id.  
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vehicle at an auction.44 Proponents of Florida’s proposed forfeiture 
law contend that the law serves as an additional deterrent to drunk 
driving.45 Moreover, proponents cite a study which indicates that 
states with vehicle seizure laws saw their rate of DUI recidivism drop 
from 50% to 4%.46 On the other hand, civil rights advocates criticize 
the bill, calling it an abuse of government forfeiture powers.47 They 
argue that Florida’s proposed forfeiture act unfairly forces individuals 
to go to civil court to retrieve their seized property, even when no 
criminal charges are filed.48 Notably, Florida’s proposed law allows 
judges some leeway when a spouse or relative is unfairly burdened 
by the forfeiture.49  
In Chicago a vehicle is subject to seizure if police officers arrest 
the driver for DUI and revoke or suspend his driver’s license due to a 
previous DUI or other prior offense.50 Chicago drivers with two or 
more DUI convictions must equip their vehicles with an “ignition-
interlock” system.51 Chicago currently permits police officers to seize 
a vehicle if, when they stop the vehicle, they find narcotics or 
weapons or if the vehicle was used to solicit prostitution.52 Unless 
police officers decide that the government can keep the vehicle on 
other state or federal forfeiture grounds, the vehicle’s owner may 
request a hearing within twenty-four hours of the incident.53 If the 
hearing officer finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an 
offense in fact occurred, the owner may retrieve the vehicle after 
“paying a $500 fine, a $115 towing fee, and any daily storage fees.”54 
If the owner is subsequently convicted of the related offense he can 
keep his vehicle, but he automatically forfeits the fine, as well as the 
towing and storage fees.55 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Retsinas, supra  note 42. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Flynn McRoberts, DUI Case Forfeitures is an Idea on the Roll; Momentum Building 
for Seizing Vehicles, CHI. T RIB., Mar. 21, 1999, at 1. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54.  Id. 
 55. McRoberts, supra  note 50.  
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C. New York City has Enacted the Property Clerk Forfeiture Act 
New York City’s Forfeiture Act took effect in February 1999. The 
City implemented the Forfeiture Act to combat excessive drunk 
driving, in conjunction with New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s 
desire to implement a zero-tolerance policy for DWI offenses.56 
Under the Forfeiture Act, the City can seize a vehicle if the driver has 
a blood-alcohol level of .10% or higher, regardless of whether the 
driver has prior DWI convictions.57 The City then can tow the vehicle 
to a city lot and hold it until the driver is convicted and the City can 
sell the car at auction.58 Even if the driver is acquitted, he still may be 
required to prove in civil court that his vehicle should be returned.59 
Discussing the effectiveness of the Forfeiture Act, Mayor Giuliani 
stated that from the inception of the program on February 22, 1999 
until March 25, 1999, New York City police officers arrested 342 
people for driving while intoxicated and seized 164 vehicles.60 Mayor 
Giuliani added that, of the 178 vehicles that were not seized, “149 
belonged to individuals other than the accused driver, 12 were leased 
cars, 6 were rental cars, and 11 were marked as evidence for other 
crimes, such as car theft.”61 Mayor Giuliani also noted that accidents 
 
 56. K.C. Boey, Howard Gives Top Priority for Drugs Issue, T HE NEW STRAITS T IMES, 
Mar. 3, 1999, at 10. Mothers Against Drunk Driving’s (MADD) National President praised the 
forfeiture initiative launched by Mayor Giuliani. Bill Farrell, Police Targets DWIs/Head of 
MADD Hails New City Crack Down, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 3, 1999, at 1. 
 57. Richard Wolf, NYC Car-Seizure Law Draws Imitators but Civil Libertarians Focus 
Attention on its Legality, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 1999, at A3. 
 58. Id. Traditionally, a driver arrested for a first -time DWI offense is allowed to plead 
guilty to a charge of driving while ability impaired (DWAI), a non-criminal offense. Sean 
Gardiner, Will DWI Policy Seize the Courts?/Giuliani Plan May Spur Jam , NEWSDAY (New 
York), Mar. 15, 1999, at A7. “The fines for . . . DWAI are $300 to $500 and up to 15 days in 
jail, compared to a $500 to $1,000 fine and punishment of up to a year in jail for DWI.” Id.  
 59. Wolf, supra note 57. The burden of proof for forfeiture is lower than the burden of 
proof needed for a DUI conviction. Therefore, a driver could potentially be acquitted of a DUI 
charge, but still lose his automobile to forfeiture. Chris Heidenrish & Tony Gordon, DUI 
Suspects Stand to Lose More Than Licenses: Repeat Offenders May Find Their Cars Seized, 
CHI. DAILY HERALD, Mar. 28, 1999, at 1.  
 60. David M. Herszenhorn, Giuliani Says Crackdown on Drunken Drivers Cuts 
Accidents, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 31, 1999, at B2 (citing figures from police department statistics). 
 61. Id. Since the Forfeiture Act took effect on February 22, 1999, 164 vehicles have been 
confiscated. Douglas Feiden, DWI Accidents Dip 39% Rudy Sez His Policy Saves Lives,  N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 31, 1999, at 8. Fifty-four of these vehicles were involved in accidents. Id. 
The average breathalyzer reading was .17%, with .1% being the lowest reading and .34% being 
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involving drunk drivers, DWI arrests, and vehicular fatalities 
declined in the time the program was in force.62 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW 
YORK CITY’S PROPERTY CLERK FORFEITURE ACT IS CHALLENGED 
Less than two days after the City’s Forfeiture Act took effect, City 
police officers arrested Pavel Grinberg for DWI and seized his car.63 
After police refused his attorney’s demand that the vehicle be 
returned, Grinberg brought an action seeking the return of his car and 
the invalidation of the Forfeiture Act.64 The New York Supreme 
Court held that Grinberg failed to demonstrate that the Forfeiture Act 
is “unconstitutional, contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious, either 
on its face or as applied to him.”65 As such, the court dismissed 
Grinberg’s constitutional challenge.66 
The Grinberg court rejected the argument that the Forfeiture Act 
 
the highest reading. Id. Of first -time DWI offenders, 103 were involved in accidents and seven 
repeat offenders were involved in accidents. Id. 
 62. Herszenhorn, supra  note 60. Mayor Giuliani also said, “the number of accidents 
caused by [drunk] driving had declined to 110 from 179 in the same period [the previous] year.” 
Id. This shows a decline of nearly 39%. DWI arrests fell approximately 25% during the same 
period. Id. During the period from February 22 to May 30, fatalities were down 37.5% from the 
same period the previous year, from eight deaths to five. Id. 
 63. Grinberg , 694 N.Y.S.2d at 319-20. Grinberg, a 28-year-old maintenance man, told 
police he had consumed one beer three hours prior to his arrest. Salvatore Arena & Frank 
Lombardi, Seizing Cars is Legal Move, Judge Rules, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 20, 1999 at 5. 
“The arresting officer concluded that petitioner was intoxicated based on the strong smell of 
alcohol, watery and bloodshot eyes, and coordination tests.” Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 320. 
Also, a breathalyzer test revealed that the petitioner had a blood alcohol level of .11%. Id. New 
York’s legal threshold for breathalyzer tests is .10%. Id. 
 64. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 320. The challenge was actually filed by the New York 
Civil Liberties Union on Pavel Grinberg’s behalf. Graham Rayman, Judge Approves DWI Car 
Seizure, NEWSDAY (New York), May 20, 1999, at A7. Grinberg was the second person arrested 
on a charge of DWI under the Forfeiture Act. Id. “The first driver arrested, Francisco Almonte 
of Corona, was sentenced . . . to [one] to [three] years in jail and had his driver’s license 
revoked after pleading guilty.” Id. “The Grinberg-NYCLU court papers alleged that the city 
acted without legal basis, that Grinberg’s car was not evidence in a crime, that he was denied 
due process, and that taking his car was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the state and 
federal constitutions.” Id. Grinberg appeared on television after the arrest saying that “the loss 
of his car prevented him and his wife from getting to work or anywhere else conveniently.” Id. 
The property clerk filed a separate action against the petitioner “for a judgment declaring the 
vehicle forfeited as the instrumentality of [DWI].” Grinberg , 694 N.Y.S.2d at 320. 
 65. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 328. 
 66. Id.  
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was preempted by another state law.67 The court reasoned that 
nothing in the Forfeiture Act’s legislative history indicated that the 
New York legislature intended to occupy the field.68 Therefore, the 
availability of other rights and remedies was preserved as long as the 
new law did not violate overriding state policy.69 Because the 
Forfeiture Act implemented current law, the court noted that it did 
not need additional legislative authorization.70 
The court also rejected Grinberg’s argument that the forfeiture 
was criminal rather than civil because the City brought the forfeiture 
action against Grinberg instead of his vehicle.71 The court reasoned 
that “[t]he nature and purpose of the remedy sought is significant, not 
the form of the action or the method of obtaining jurisdiction.”72 
Therefore, the court found that “[t]he City’s forfeiture action 
appropriately seeks a declaratory judgment. . . requiring a plenary 
action against an individual and personal service.”73 The City sought 
no relief other than a declaration of rights in the vehicle; thus, the 
 
 67. Id. at 320-21.  
 68. Id. at 321.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 321.  
 71. Id. The court also rejected petitioner’s argument that the “City unconstitutionally 
violated the separation of powers by imposing an additional DWI sentence, beyond that 
authorized by state law.” Id. The court stated that “[n]o case has deemed forfeiture a criminal 
sentence if sought in a separate civil action. Cases under the City[’s] forfeiture law have been 
sustained irrespective of the status of the related criminal cases.” Id. Therefore, the court held 
that separation of powers is not violated. In addition, the court rejected the petitioner’s 
argument that, under the federal constitution, forfeiture constitutes punishment and is therefore 
a violation of law. Id. The court stated that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Austin v. United States, 
509 U.S. 602 (1997), did not hold that “forfeiture constitute[s] a sentence or punishment for 
double jeopardy or separation of powers analysis.” Grinberg , 694 N.Y.S.2d at 321. Therefore, 
the court found the petitioner’s argument unpersuasive. Id. at 321-22. 
 72. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 322 (citing Ursery, 518 U.S. 267). “Civil forfeiture actions 
for instrumentalities traditionally were brought in rem against the ‘guilty’ property.” Id. at 321 
(citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14 and United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 
U.S. at 57-58). Jurisdiction was obtained by seizure, attachment, or lien because the absent or 
unknown owners of the property could not be personally served.” Id. In personam jurisdiction 
was not needed because “the litigation sought only the property, not a money judgment.” Id. “In 
contrast, collection of fines, assessments, and penalties need fully exportable money judgments 
entitled to full faith and credit, requiring in personam jurisdiction. In personam civil 
proceedings to collect fines, assessment and penalties from a criminal defendant has been held 
punitive for double jeopardy analysis.” Id. at 321-22. 
 73. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 322. 
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action was civil, not criminal.74 
Moreover, the court rejected Grinberg’s argument that the taking 
and retention of his vehicle was an unreasonable seizure under the 
U.S. Constitution.75 The court held that “the seizure was reasonable 
under the theories of plain view, incident to arrest, and the 
automobile exception.”76 Under the plain view exception, warrantless 
seizures are permissible when “contraband, instrumentalities, or 
evidence is found where it is immediately apparent to police 
officers.77 In Grinberg, the court observed that “[i]t was immediately 
apparent during the stop that the car was the . . . instrumentality [to 
the DWI] subjecting it to seizure.”78 Under the incident to lawful 
arrest exception, police officers are allowed to search the area within 
the driver’s control for instrumentalities without a warrant.79 In this 
case, because the police observed Grinberg driving the vehicle and 
then arrested him for intoxication, Grinberg could not reassume 
control of the vehicle.80 Given the vehicle’s status as an 
instrumentality, only the police had the right to possess the vehicle.81 
Finally, under the automobile exception, police are permitted “to stop 
and search a vehicle if they have probable cause that it contains 
contraband, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime.”82 As such, the 
police can seize a vehicle that is an instrumentality of a crime.83 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. Petitioner argued that the seizure was illegal because the police seized his vehicle 
without cause or a warrant, which is required by the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV). 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)). “‘Immediately apparent’ does 
not mean at first glance, but before conclusion of the officer’s on-scene inquiry.” Id. (citing 
People v. Marinelli, 458 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)). The police observed Grinberg 
driving on public streets. After concluding that Grinberg was intoxicated, the police had 
probable cause to believe that Grinberg committed the DWI. Id. The breathalyzer test supported 
this finding. Id. 
 78. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 322.  
 79. Id. at 323. These searches are allowed because they are minimally intrusive, spatially 
limited, and contemporaneous. Id. Furthermore, they do not encroach on an arrestee’s privacy 
significantly more than the arrest. Id. Retention of a vehicle is necessary because they are 
highly mobile, secretable, and transferable. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Grinberg , 694 N.Y.S.2d at 323. 
 83. Id. 
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Because Grinberg used the vehicle to commit DWI, it was an 
instrumentality to that DWI and was lawfully seized. Therefore, the 
court held that the warrantless seizure and retention of Grinberg’s 
vehicle was constitutional under the theories of plain view, incident 
to lawful arrest, and the automobile exception.84 
In addition, Grinberg argued that the Forfeiture Act violates the 
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it authorizes the 
police to take and retain a vehicle without a hearing.85 The court 
rejected this argument, stating that “immediate seizure of a drunk 
driver’s automobile upon arrest is necessary because the arrestee is 
legally and physically incapable of driving.”86 The court further 
reasoned that because a vehicle is easily moved or concealed, 
advance warning of confiscation could prevent police from effecting 
forfeiture.87 The court also stated that the “City’s interest in deterring 
drunk driving and ensuring enforceability of a subsequent forfeiture 
order clearly outweighed the private interest affected” by the law.88 
Finally, Grinberg challenged the Forfeiture Act on the ground that 
forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine, and thus violates the Eighth 
Amendment.89 The court held that while forfeiture may be a “fine,” 
the forfeiture in the instant case was not excessive for the following 
reasons: (1) Grinberg’s vehicle was the instrumentality of a crime, 
inseparable from the crime, and its prerequisite; (2) DWI is a serious 
crime in its sentence and effect; and (3) although Grinberg estimated 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 323. The petitioner relied on the Fourteenth Amendment 
for this argument. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment states that the government must give an individual notice and a fair opportunity to 
be heard before the government can deprive the person of his property. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d 
at 324. 
 86. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 325. The law does not require police to turn a vehicle over 
to someone who could cause an accident or who might fail to return it. Id. at 43 n.10.  
 87. Id. The court further stated that the risk of erroneous deprivation is minimized because 
the arresting officers are government employees who receive no economic benefit from the 
seizure. Id. The court also reasoned that “[t]he seizure is simultaneous with a DWI arrest for 
which the police must have probable cause. The arresting officer evaluates an offense 
committed in his or her presence. Indicia of alcohol consumption and objective tests confirming 
the presence of alcohol minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation.” Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Grinberg , 694 N.Y.S.2d at 326. “If a civil forfeiture contains a punitive element, it is 
deemed a fine under the Eighth Amendment despite its remedial purpose, and must be analyzed 
for excessiveness.” Id. at 327. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/13
p361 Whittle.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Property Clerk Forfeiture Act 373 
 
 
the value of his vehicle at $2,000, the vehicle’s retention and 
forfeiture was “not unreasonably harsh as a matter of law.”90 
Therefore, the court held that the forfeiture did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.91 New York’s Forfeiture Act survived constitutional 
challenge.92 
III. ANALYSIS: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FORFEITURE ACT 
A. The Due Process Clause 
In order for the Supreme Court to hold that a forfeiture does not 
violate the Due Process Clause, the government must show that the 
property owner had notice and an opportunity to contest the 
abatement of the vehicle.93 However, for a due process inquiry, 
precedent does not require that the Court determine whether the use 
for which the property was forfeited is the principle use of the 
property.94  
New York’s Forfeiture Act requires the property clerk to bring a 
forfeiture claim within twenty-five days of the property owner’s 
demand for release of his vehicle.95 This requirement gives the 
property owner notice that a forfeiture action has been commenced 
 
 90. Id. at 327-28. The court analyzed the petitioner’s argument pursuant to the following 
three tests advanced for measuring excessiveness: proportionality, instrumentality, and a mixed 
instrumentality-proportionality analysis. Id. at 327. Under the instrumentality test, the petitioner 
was driving his vehicle at the time of the incident: “The owner’s role and his use of the property 
are temporally and spatially coextensive with the offense charged.” Id. Under the 
proportionality test, DWI is a serious crime that injures and kills. The threat posed by drunk 
drivers is irrefutable. Id. Finally, under the mixed instrumentality-proportionality test, the 
severity of the offense and its societal impact are high compared to the petitioner and the co-
owner’s inconvenience. Therefore, the vehicle’s retention and forfeiture was not unreasonably 
harsh. Id. at 328. “Given the severity of the available sentence [a fine of $1,000 and three years 
probation, or a combination, plus loss of driving privileges], forfeiture of a used car valued at 
twice the maximum fine is not grossly disproportionate. Neither is this instrumentality 
forfeiture greater in relation to the offense than others sustained.” Id. 
 91. Grinberg , 694 N.Y.S.2d at 328. 
 92. Id. This decision was later affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New York 
Supreme Court. See Grinberg v. Safir, 698 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
 93. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 446. The Due Process Clause is found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 94. Bennis,  516 U.S. at 450. 
 95. Grinberg , 694 N.Y.S.2d at 326 n.13. 
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against his vehicle and allows the petitioner an opportunity to defend 
against the action in court. Therefore, the Forfeiture Act conforms 
with the Due Process Clause.96 In addition, Grinberg’s argument that 
confiscation of a vehicle before the owner has been convicted of a 
crime violates substantive due process is misplaced. As the Grinberg 
court persuasively noted: “the City’s interest in deterring drunk 
driving and ensuring enforceability of a subsequent forfeiture order 
clearly outweighs the private interest affected.”97  
B. The Takings Clause 
Co-owners of forfeited property argue that forfeiture statutes 
violate the Takings Clause because the statutes do not require 
prosecutors to separate the rights or interests of the co-owner that 
committed the illegal act from those of the innocent co-owner.98 
Courts reject this argument, relying on seventy-five years of 
precedence holding that such statutes are constitutional under 
punitive and remedial jurisprudence.99 Courts consistently hold that 
whether the seized vehicle has a co-owner is irrelevant, even if the 
co-owner has no knowledge of the illegal activity.100 Therefore, the 
New York Forfeiture Act is consistent with similar forfeiture laws 
held to be constitutional.101 
 
 96. In Grinberg , the court looked at several factors to determine whether the delay 
between a seizure and the initiation of judicial proceedings violated due process based on the 
petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Id. at 325. The court considered factors such as length of 
delay, reason for the delay, the petitioner’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the petitioner. 
Id. The petitioner’s case in Grinberg  was heard within eighteen days of the seizure. Id. at 326 
n.13. Therefore, the court found that the hearing was not subject to delay and was within due 
process rights. Id. at 326. 
 97. Id. at 325. The court further explained that requiring a pre-seizure hearing would be 
impractical if it was required as part of the arrest or arraignment. Id. Returning the vehicle to its 
owner would prevent the City from beginning a forfeiture action because the Forfeiture Act 
applies only to items in the property clerk’s possession. Id. at 325 n.11. See supra  text 
accompanying note 92. 
 98. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 449, 452. 
 99. Id. at 453. 
 100. Id. at 452-53. 
 101. See, e.g., supra  notes 18-19. The Bennis court stated that these policy reasons were 
consistent with the long-standing precedent upholding the constitutionality of forfeiture laws. 
Bennis,  516 U.S. at 453. 
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C. The Excessive Fines Clause 
Opponents of the Forfeiture Act contend that it is unfair for the 
City to retain the proceeds from the sale of forfeited vehicles because 
the value of the vehicle is often greater than the probable fine.102 
Therefore, opponents argue that the Forfeiture Act violates the 
Excessive Fines Clause.103 Courts hold that if the forfeiture of 
property amounts to a punishment, the forfeiture will be subject to the 
limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause.104  
The Grinberg court found that the Forfeiture Act was punitive in 
nature.105 The court then analyzed the fine for excessiveness and held 
the fine was not “grossly disproportionate.”106 The court’s analysis is 
questionable considering the fact that Grinberg’s car was valued at 
twice the maximum fine.107 Furthermore, the court’s opinion is 
incomplete because it failed to define the term “grossly 
disproportionate.” Nevertheless, the Forfeiture Act itself is not likely 
to be defeated under the Excessive Fines Clause if the forfeiture 
involved was reasonable.108 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts uphold forfeiture laws under the U.S. Constitution. The use 
of these laws has increased and neither Congress nor the Supreme 
 
 102. See Alan Finder, Drive Drunk, Lose the Car? Principle Faces a Test, N.Y. T IMES, 
Feb. 24, 1999, at B1. 
 103. The Excessive Fines Clause is part of the Eighth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend 
VIII. 
 104. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 281. The Ursery Court reviewed the history of civil forfeiture in 
the United States and in England to determine whether a civil penalty constitutes punishment. 
Id. The Court then concluded that the statute in that particular case constituted “payment to a 
sovereign as punishment for some offense.” Id. Therefore, the forfeiture statute in Ursery was 
subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id.  
 105. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 327. 
 106. Id. The court stated that, despite a civil forfeiture’s remedial purpose, “if the civil 
forfeiture contains a punitive element, it is deemed a fine . . . and must be analyzed for 
excessiveness.” Id. The Grinberg  court also noted that the Supreme Court found a civil 
forfeiture to be punitive even though the forfeiture “[had] an ‘escape hatch’ for innocent 
owners[,] link[ed] the forfeited property directly to the crime [and lacked] specific correlation 
between the property’s value and the crime’s social cost.” Id. (citing Austin v. United States, 
509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993)).  
 107. Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 328. 
 108. See id. at 327 (discussing the court’s analysis of the excessiveness tests).  
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Court indicates disfavor for such laws. Under current law, New York 
City’s Property Clerk Forfeiture Act is constitutional under the Due 
Process, Takings, and Excessive Fines Clauses. The question that 
remains, however, is how far the Supreme Court will allow 
government entities to extend forfeiture laws before the Court 
decides that an individual’s rights have been trampled. Currently, the 
government’s forfeiture power extends to drunk driving offenses. 
Forfeiture has proven to be a very powerful tool in the fight against 
drugs and prostitution. Undoubtedly, if left unscathed by the courts, 
forfeiture will be an effective mechanism in the fight against drunk 
driving. 
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